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Contamination of groundwater by agricultural practices 
presents a dilemma between protecting a vital resource and 
preserving a valuable part of the economy. A model is developed to reflect the current state of agriculture in Eastern Suffolk 
County. This model consists of a recursive programming 
component, which has input for it generated by a model of 
Colorado potato beetle pest dynamics and management strategies to 
control those pests.
The model is run under different policy settings, which 
include no regulation, taxation of pesticides, ban of selected 
pesticides, forced crop rotations, taxation of potatoes, purchase 
of crop rights, ban of potatoes, and the development of pest 
control districts. The last eight of these policy settings take 
as given the ban on pesticides. While income is reduced by 
banning pesticides, the reduction is small when compared with the 
improvement in environmental quality. Further efforts to reduce 
pesticide use resulted in a reduction in potato acreage and 
incomes, as well as yields.
While short-run economic considerations would favor the 
status quo, a broader long-run perspective encourages further 
efforts to reduce pesticide use and coordinate economic and 
environmental considerations.
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introduction
Pesticide contamination of groundwater has been 
reported in many states. Efforts have been made to 
prevent further contamination, but environmental 
agencies are often reluctant to put too much 
regulatory pressure on agriculture. Part of this 
stems from the ambivalence of the public surrounding 
agriculture, the economy and the environment. On the 
one hand, neighbors view agriculture positively 
protector of open space and mainstay for the economy. 
On the other hand, agricultural pollution can be 
aesthetically displeasing for many of these same
people, and even health threatening in some cases.
One region where the dilemma has been 
particularly acute is Eastern Suffolk County, on Long 
Island in New York State. Suffolk County leads New 
York State in agricultural commodity sales. While 
there are a wide variety of crops produced on Long 
Island, the most important has been potatoes. Potato 
monocropping has lead to escalating pest control 
requirements. To combat pests such as the Colorado 
Potato Beetle, farmers have felt compelled to apply
1
2pesticides, some of these pesticides used to control 
the c p b have been found in the groundwater. Three of 
these, aldicarb, carbofuran, and oxamyl, have been 
banned for use on Long island.
This paper examines the economic and
environmental effects of different policies which are
designed to protect groundwater from pesticide
contamination. To do this, a model is developed.
Alternative policies regulating pesticide use and
encouraging cultural practices whichF tlces winch are presumably
less Ulcely to have an adverse affect on groundwater
are incorporated in this model. The model is then
used to compare the different policies effect on
income, hazard of contamination, and acute health 
risk.
&-MgfleI_.of Long Island's Aqr|CDlf„ria
The model used to! analyze Long Island
agriculture's impact on groundwater under different 
policies has three components: a recursive regional 
programming model, a biological model of Colorado 
potato beetle population dynamics, and indices of
groundwater quality, These three components are
then integrated by using their common variables, 
output from the biological model serves as input for 
the economic model, output from the economic model is
3
used to evaluate the potential for groundwater 
leaching, and acute health hazards.
To reflect farm decision making, the objective 
function of the model seeks to maximize farmer gross 
margin, that is, gross receipts over variable costs.
The objective function can be expressed as
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where pit is the price of crop i in year t? yit
amount of crop i produced in year t ? c ^  is the variable
cost per acre of producing crop i in year t, not 
counting labor and pesticide variable costs; x n t is the 
number of acres of crop i grown on land 1 in year t; 
is the cost of pesticide $ in year t; is the
amount of pesticide ¥ used in year t ; w-^  wage of hired 
labor in year t; HLABTt is the amount of labor hired in 
season t of year t; Ai^ is the price per acre of land 1 
in year t? SELLANDit is the number of acres of land 1 
sold in year t . Data for prices and costs used in the 
model are explained in Baker (1985). This objective 
function is subject to several constraints. The first 
constraint is the land constraint.
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Where LAND - the total amount of land of type 1 
in production in year t. The next constraints 
are on the amount of labor which is available to 
the farm sector.
(3)
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Where FLAB^ is the amount of skilled (family)
labor used in season t of year t, FLAB and____ Tt
HLABTt are the upper limits on family and hired labor
in season t of year t. The technical coefficients
are represented by aist? alut, a^st, and. a^ .ut,
labor required by crop i, unskilled labor required by
crop i, skilled labor required to apply pesticide iJr and
unskilled labor required to apply pesticide i/r,
respectively.
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is the yield for crop i, iand type lfWhere aiivt 1S une y
„ i_ vear t. Flexibilitypest control program v in year
constraints tor each crop are calcuated by * * * * * * *  
the flexibility coefficients, J L and 6i, the upper an
lower bounds for crop i, respectively, by the amount o
crop i grown in period t-1.
.„fc stated as follows*.These constraints are
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The flexibility constraints were estimated from 
series data. A conservative approach was taken,
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Where {1} is the set of all irrigated land and {U> 
is the set of all unirrigated land, and px is the 
flexibility constraint for the increase in irrigation. 
These flexibility constraints were estimated by using 
annual average changes over quintennial periods recorded
in the Census of Agriculture.
constraints on the land market are modelled by
equation 13.
17
y
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The flexibility constraints for the sale of land 
were derived the same way as the flexibility constraints 
for crops. Data for land in farms over the past 40 
years was used to estimate the maximum and minimum
changes.
pog-h Population Dynamics and_J?ontrol
To model the response of farmers to policies which 
change their decisions to apply pesticides, one must 
take into account the way that these changes affect pest 
population dynamics. In modeling pest population 
dynamics, three things are relevant to economic decision 
makipg: quantity of sprays, timing of sprays and pest
8P p lation effects on yield. With programmed spraying, 
quantity and timing of sprays are set a^riori. Yields
vary randomly with population density. As pest
population density increases, pest damage to crops 
increases and this damage decreases the final yield of 
the crops. This relationship can be statistically 
estimated. Most production studies use expected yield 
to make the model deterministic.
Different pest management practices are presented 
to farmers as behavioral alternatives. Farmers will 
adopt those strategies which are successful. Those 
which are unsuccessful will cause farmers to continue to 
search for new techniques. The use of certain pest 
control techniques w i n  iead to changes in the
biological system. These changes will feed back into 
the economic system and w i n  cause the state variables 
to change. The model captures the changing resistance 
Of pest populations through feedback.
When modelling 1PM, the timing, and sometimes even 
the application rates are no longer deterministic. They 
will vary according to pest population. Spraying w i n  
occur when the pest population meets or exceeds a
certain threshold. To monitor the pest population, 
fields are scouted at regular intervals, if the pest 
population exceeds a given threshold, then some action 
is taken to control the population. Let DD represent
9
degree days, CPB represent Colorado potato beetle 
population. Potato beetle population can be 
mathematically represented as (Logan)i
b +b.*DD+b *DD2+b *DD3
(14) CPB = e 0 1
where e is the base of natural logarithms. The double 
log form of equation 14 was used to estimate this 
relationship by a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (Logan). 
The density of CPBs over the growing season (A) is an 
important factor in determining the damage to potato 
crops. This is found by taking the integral (Logan):
■ DD
(15) A = CPB (DD) d (DD)
J 0
The value of A was then used to predict the yield 
loss caused by CPBs (Logan)i
M6) Y " Y (1 “ 0.000168A). v m
Where Y = the predicted yield and Ym - the maximum 
yield. The coefficients bg, bi, t>2< an<^  ^3 mus^
estimated for each different set of field history, 
infestation, and management practices. The coefficients 
which were estimated by Logan were adjusted for Long 
island conditions. Population growth is then modelled
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f°r each scouting period,
and ending in September, 
represented as
two weeks, beginning in May 
The decision to spray can be
(17) if CPB ^ threshold 0 if CPB < threshold
When pesticides are applied, a certain percentage
of the beetles will be killed. This percentage, known 
as the mortality rate, is a function of the size of the 
dosage, the toxicity of, and the resistance in the 
insects to the pesticide being used. The rate of 
survival, s, can be thought of as
(18) sft = CPBfl - MR^t) (° <; MR £ 1}
where S is the survival 
rate. The insects then 
continue their growth.
rate, and MR is the mortality 
recover from this level, and 
This model assumes that growth
rates are unchanged by insecticide application and 
remain affected only by time and temperature.
The mortality rate declines over time as the
insects become resistant to a given pesticide. This 
introduces a recursive aspect to the model, requiring a 
feedback loop which accounts for the declining efficacy 
of a pesticide. This states that for a given year, t, 
the mortality rate associated with a given pesticide
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will be a function of whether or not that pesticide was 
used the previous year. This relationship is shown is
equation 19.
(19) M „ *Vi(t-i)i£rlt K^ >
Where ^  is the resistance factor of pesticide *.
Equation 20 makes sure that the total amount of 
pesticides used for all crops adds up to the amount used 
for each crop. Pesticide application rates for potatoes 
and other crops are explained in Balter*
( 2 0 )
17 8
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The base year chosen for this study was 1983. A 
model solution consisted of simulating five growing 
seasons. Each growing season was broken up into two
week scouting periods.
•p m  icy Analysis
Different policies are summarized in table 1. In 
addition to a laissez faire scenario, variations on 
prohibitions, taxes and subsidies, and control of 
cultural practices are considered.
12
2
3
4,
5.
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Table 1
Policies Considered for. Analyst
Sase Run (laissez fair©)„
Ban aldicarb*
Ban aldicarb, oarbofuran and oxamyl. 
lax on aldicarb, oarbofuran and oxamyl. 
Tax on growing potatoes.
6. Purchase of chenical/orop rights.
7. Forced rotation out of potatoes.
8. Pest control districts.
9. Moratorium on potatoes.
All of the policies analyzed, with the exception of 
the base run and the policy taxing pesticides, assume 
that the pesticides which have been banned or removed 
from the market are not available for use on Long
island. This assumption reflects that re-registration 
of the banned pesticides is politically unacceptable.
Ban on Selected
The first modification made of the laissez-faire 
model is a ban on aldicarb. This was done by simply
adding a constraint to the LP model which required 
aldicarb loadings be less than or equal to zero.
13
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Where *b is the set of banned pesticides. Huns 
were made with bans on aldioarb only; aldicarb and 
carbofuran; and aldioarb, oarbofuran and oxamyl.
The dual, or shadow price for the constraint 
banning aldicarb ranges between $24 and $47 per pound of 
active ingredient over the five years. This would be 
the amount a farmer should be willing to pay per pound 
of active ingredient of aldioarb if there were no 
constraints on the purchase of aldicarb. The banning 
of aldicarb results in its replacement by carbofuran, 
which dominates other pest control alternatives, but not 
to the degree that aldicarb did. Carbofuran, like 
aldicarb, was followed by replacement by substitute 
methods of pest control when resistance developed. 
However, the substitution is very small, as carbofuran 
is used on 100% of all potato land the first four years
and 99% the fifth and final year.
The current policy, where aldicarb, carbofuran and 
oxamyl are not available to farmers for use, is the next 
considered. A constraint forcing carbofuran 
applications to be less than or equal to zero was added 
to the model. The oxamyl program was removed from the
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model, and a pest control decisions were based upon a
choice between the pesticides kryocide, pydrin and 
rotenone.
laxes^and S u b s i d e
Economists have long favored taxes and subsidies
as an efficient means for dealing with externalities. A 
tax on externalities would make the private cost of 
those inputs more closely reflect the social cost which 
they inflict (Baumol and Oates). The implementation of 
a tax on agricultural inputs has several advantages over 
other measures to remedy their pollution. Because many 
producers are involved, the cost of enforcing practices 
would be high compared With the cost of setting and 
collecting a tax. A tax provides an incentive for the 
farmer to reduce the amount of the input, if the farmer 
reduces chemical inputs, the amount of pesticide or
fertilizer which reaches the saturated zone of the soil 
is reduced.
With the tax, the farmer's objective function
becomes
17 17 8
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in spite of their market efficiency, taxes on 
externalities have never received much attention in the 
United States. The efficient taxation of externalities 
present analysts with an infinite number of choices of 
how to model taxation. Optimal taxation requires 
information not only of the marginal product of the 
externality, but also of the social welfare trade-off
between pollution and production.
The value of the marginal product of pesticides can 
be estimated with some precision, but the preferences of 
society can only be reflected in the political process, 
as there is no market for pristine environment. The 
optimal tax on pesticide will vary from pesticide to 
pesticide, depending on its price, marginal product, 
toxicity, and environmental characteristics. A tax on 
all pesticides at the same rate would be an inefficient 
way of reducing potato acreage and may also fail to 
reduce the use of those which have the greater threat to
the environment.
Parametric programming was used to discover the tax 
rates which would cause farmers to shift to pesticides 
other than those which were banned (Baker). The taxes 
selected by parametric analysis were $125 per pound of 
active ingredient of aldicarb, $65 per pound of active 
ingredient of carbofuran and $70 per pound of active 
ingredient of oxamyl.
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An alternative way to tax the externalities caused 
by pesticides is to tax the crop that requires their 
use. This is specified in the model by a transfer row 
which reduces Income a given amount for every acre of
potatoes grown. The objective function then becomes:
17 17 8
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Where TAXp is the tax per acre of potatoes grown. 
Sensitivity analysis was performed to determine the
amount tax that would reduce potato acreage (Baker).
The model was run with a tax of $750 per acre. This is 
between 40% and 5-0% of gross and between 50% and 60% of 
net margin per acre. The lower yielding North Fork 
unirrigated continuous potato land leaves production 
first. The last land to leave production of potatoes is 
South Fork land which is irrigated and grown in rotation 
with field crops.
These tax levels seem high, it should be remem­
bered that the tax reduces the margin on potatoes 
and does nothing to otherwise enhance the value of other 
crops. With labor as a constraint preventing the 
wholesale shift into high-value labor intensive crops,
17
it is not surprising to see farmers choose lower profits
before producing other crops.
Below $750, it seemed unlikely that the tax would
be an effective incentive for farmers to shift 
production. Above $1000, the tax has roughly the same 
result as a ban on potatoes. No potatoes are grown, 
no tax is collected, income is roughly the same.
A conservation subsidy program would pay farmers to 
grow low-input crops. The crops which are included m  
the program are rye, oats, wheat, soybeans, sunflowers 
and dry beans. Other crops were not included because 
there is a lack of information on how to grow these 
crops without the chemical control of pests. An analyst 
who attempted to include other crops would face the 
arduous task of collecting a second set of budgets for 
each crop, grown without the use of many or any 
pesticides.
This program is more restrictive to farm income 
than would be a program which purchases chemical rights 
and permits farmers to grow any crop. The conservation 
subsidy was considered on an. individual acre by acre 
basis, so that land on a farm in the program could be 
used to grow potatoes. Because this approach uses 
economic incentives, rather than legal sanctions or 
financial disincentives, it is the most lucrative policy 
for farmers of the ones examined.
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A transfer row was introduced to the LP model which 
caused gross margin to increase by $750 for each acrte of 
"the low-input, conservation crops grown.
The objective function becomesi
17 17 8
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Where SUBSit is the subsidy for crop x in year t, 
and x represents the set of low-input crops which are 
subsidized. As with the taxation programs, sensitivity
analysis was performed to discover the rate of taxation 
which would cause a significant change in the optimal 
solution. The analysis of the base year suggested that 
below $700 per acre there would be minimal response to a 
conservation subsidy program. There would be a certain 
number of acres in non-host crops even if there was no 
program subsidizing their cultivation. Above $1000, 
there would be few acres which would not be enrolled in 
the program. However, the cost of the program at $26 
million per year could be prohibitively expensive for 
local government.
The conservation subsidy program frees up potato 
labor so that more acres of labor intensive crops can be 
grown. The low-input crops selected are also the
19
least labor Intensive. Therefore, not only is the 
acreage in small grains increased, but so is the acreage
in vegetable crops.
mntroi or.aflfaual-Bastisfia
A constraint was introduced which required that 
half of the.land used to grow potatoes the previous year 
had to be used to grow another crop. The use of crop 
rotation as a pest control strategy introduces another 
dynamic element to the model, as seen by equation 25.
(25)
17 8
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The constraints on irrigation (equations 26 and 27) 
reflects the reluctance of farmers who have invested in 
irrigation to dismantle their equipment, and the 
reluctance of farmers who have not invested in 
irrigation to purchase equipment which will not 
to its full potential. These constraints are given by
equations 26 and 27.
(26)
(27)
V  LAND1 (t-1)
17
£ x <; (i i=l lit
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pssst control district performs four functions 
specified in the model. First, it regulates the 
rotation of crops involving potatoes,- second, it 
controls the decision over which pesticide to use, 
rather than the farmers,- third, it provides labor 
for scouting and the materials for pest control free
of charge to farmers,- fourth, participation is mandatory 
and there is no way for a farmer to opt out.
The pest control district model also required
The crop rotation requirements for this model 
are the same as those given in equation 25. The
irrigation constraints in equations 25 and 27 are also 
part of the pest control district model. Equations 4 
and 5 are replaced by equation 28 and 29 to reflect the 
fact that neither family nor hired labor is used for 
scouting and pesticide applications.
17 8
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The subscript p represents the set of potato 
growing activities. The price of pesticides to farmers 
was set to zero. The farmer no longer has to provide 
labor for pest control. All labor, including spraying, 
is assumed to be provided by the district. No other 
labor requirements are changed.
The values for oc$ were raised. Pesticide 
applications were limited to a synthetic pyrethroid with 
low mammalian toxicity and short half-life, Pydrin, used 
with a synergist, PBO. A requirement was made that at 
least one fifth of the applications use rotenone to 
forestall the build-up of resistance.
To reflect a moratorium on potatoes, a constraint 
is introduced in the first year that limits the acreage 
of potatoes to zero. This is given by equation 30.
t=l
The first year of the run sets the maximum level at 
which potatoes can be grown at zero. The first year 
following the ban on potatoes sets the constraint on the 
maximum number of acres in potatoes at the number of 
acres grown in field crops the previous year. The model 
probably underestimates the acreage in potatoes after 
the moratorium is lifted. Because so many acres are in
(30) l liep 1-1
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field crops in the previous year, minimum acreage 
requirements set by the flexibility constraints for the. 
field crops prevent all the land in field crops in 19.84 
from going into potatoes*
Effect on Income
The different policies have different effects on 
farm income* Incomes.associated with the different 
policies examined are discounted and presented in table 
2* The policy which results in the highest farm income 
is the conservation subsidy* This is followed by 
the laissez faire policy and the policy which taxes the 
pesticides which have been banned* The policies which 
ban the use of the carbamates aldicarb, carbofuran and 
oxamyl do not yield as high an income as the previously, 
mentioned policies* Policies with lower incomes are, in 
descending order, pest control districts, a moratorium 
on potatoes, crop rotation, and a tax on potatoes*
While the crop rotation has a higher margin than 
banning potatoes in the first year, the control of 
potato pests is less complete, and resistance of the 
Colorado potato beetle to available pesticides is 
higher* These factors lead the crop rotation to perform 
less well economically over the long run than a 
moratorium* The two incomes are close, and are probably
23
underestimated because of the conservative handling of 
changes in population dynamics brought on by rotations»
Table 2
Average Annual Met Present Value 
Gross Margin Under Different Policies
“■million dollars- 
Discount Rate
Policy 0% 3% 5%
Laissez Faire 35.145 33.223 32.059
Ban Aldicarb 33.794 31.942 30.821
Ban Aldicarb, 
Carbofuran, Oxamyl 32.760 30.962 29.873
Tax Banned 
Pesticides 32.959 31.148 30.051
Tax Potatoes 24.732 23.358 22.527
Purchase 
Chemical Rights 37.214 35.192 33.968
Crop Rotation 28.049 26.434 25.457
Ban Potatoes 28.536 26.851 25.830
Pest Control 
District 31.474 29.717 28.654
Discounting the income streams did not reverse the 
advantage that a moratorium has over crop rotations,' 
although the difference was narrowed. A moratorium 
would cause a sharp loss in income over the first two
24
harvests, and, as such, it would be probably be 
unattractive in spite of its long run benefits.
With all' policies that cause potatoes to be shifted 
to more labor Intensive crops, it should be remembered 
that the availability of labor over the growing season 
will remain an important constraint in the transition, of 
Long Island agriculture. The labor constraint seemed to 
work against cauliflower and sweet corn to a greater 
extent than cabbage*
It is interesting to compare the solution under 
a conservation subsidy program with the solution 
of taxing potato .acreage* The asymmetry between taxes 
and subsidies is thus shown* The tax is more effective 
than the subsidy at reducing potato acreage and 
pesticide loading rates* On the other hand, the subsidy 
enhances gross margin, while the tax is detrimental 
to farm income.
The taxation of chemicals is interesting, because 
it results in a higher margin than the current policy*
A tax on chemicals is economically more efficient than a 
ban. The market is given more consideration in 
allocating inputs* However, a tax which is set too low, 
as the tax on carbofuran seems to have been, can mean 
that the tax does not adequately reflect the social cost 
of the pesticide.
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Crop Response
Crop response to different policies are given in 
three categories? Potato acreage, grain acreage, and 
vegetable acreage * Potato acreage is given in table 3.
The change in crop acreage calculates the 
difference between 1988 predicted levels (1988p) and
1984 actual levels (1984a) in thousands of acres.
Table 3
Potato Acreage for the 
1984 and 
{thousand
Different1988
acres)
Scenarios
Policy 1984 1988 Change(1988P-1984A)
Laissez Faire 15 9 4 12.6 -1.4
Ban Aldicarb 14 . 2 11.6 -2.4
Ban Aldicarb, 
Carbofuran, Oxamyl 14.1 10.9 -3.1
Crop Rotation 3.3 7.5 -6.5 ■
Tax Banned 
Pesticides 13.8 11.1 -2.9
Tax Potatoes 8.7 5.0 -9.0
Purchase 
Chemical Rights 10.8 8.7 -5.3
Pest Control 
District 7.8 8.7 -5.3
Ban Potatoes 0.0 7.7 -6.3
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Potato acreage would continue to decline even if 
pesticides were not banned. Banning pesticides, 
however, accelerates the decline* Ironically, policies 
expressly designed to reduce potato acreage are less 
successful in acheiving that end than taxing potatoes* 
Table 4 shows the change in acreage of rye, wheat, 
field corn, soybeans, oats, and other grains.
Table 4
Grain Acreage for the Different Scenarios 
1984 and 1988 
(thousand acres)
Policy 1984 1988 Change
C198.8P-1984A)
Laissez Faire 6.0 3.7 -2*3
Ban Aldicarb 6.1 3.7 -1.4
Ban Aldicarb, 
Carbofuran, Oxamyl 6.5 4.5 -1.5
Crop Rotation 17.1 7.9 1.9
Tax Banned 
Pesticides 6.9 4.3 -1.7
Tax Potatoes 11.7 9.4 3.4
Purchase 
Chemical Rights 10.2 6*5 0.5
Pest Control 
District 12.4 6.0 ©»Q
Ban Potatoes 18.2 6.2 0.2
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Grain acreage declines most rapidly under the 
laissez-faire scenario; a tax on potatoes causes grain 
acreage to increase the most. Bans on the pesticides 
slows the transition out of grain. Grain acreage 
increases with crop rotation, and stays about the same 
with the pest control district, purchase of crop rights 
and the ban on potatoes.
The aggregate acreage of cauliflower, cabbage, 
sweet corn and other vegetables are given in table 5.
Table 5
Vegetable Acreage for the Different Scenarios
1984 and 1988 
(thousand acres)
Policy 1984 1988 Change
(1988p-1984A )
Laissez Faire 10.9 10.9 -0.2
Ban Aldicarb 11.0 11.9 0.7
Ban Aldicarb, 
Carbofuran, Oxamyl 11.3 12.0 0.8
Crop Rotation 12.6 12.4 1.2
Tax Banned 
Pesticides 12.5 12.1 0.9
Tax Potatoes ■12.9 13,6 2,4
Purchase 
Chemical Rights 12.2 12.1 0.9
Pest Control
District 13.1 12.7 1.5
Ban Potatoes 16.8 13.8 2.6
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For all scenarios but the laissez-faire, vegetable 
crop acreage increases* This is consistent with the 
move to specialty crops* The increase is most marked 
with the ban on potatoes and the tax on potatoes*
Environmental Impact
Unlike farm income, pesticide use does not lend 
itself to be analyzed by a single parameter, or even 
with a common unit of measurement. Pesticides have
different characteristics and properties which make them 
have dissimilar environmental impacts* Some are more 
toxic than others, some more persistent. Because of the 
multi-attribute nature of environmental risk, a single 
number cannot give an absolute measure of risk.
However, by a combination of these quantitative 
attributes, one can:derive a relative measure of risk. 
The result is a qualitative measure which can be used to 
rank alternative policies for their potential hazard to 
public health and the environment.
Concentration of a given contaminant is a function 
of soil characteristics, such as bulk density, porosity, 
organic matter content, pH, and moisture content? plant 
cover and uptake; rainfall and temperature? the charac­
teristics of the.pesticides, such as adsorption to
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soil, solubility, volatilization, longevity and plant 
uptake,- and management practices, such as number of 
applications, application rates, and incorporation into 
soil. The indices used are based on chemodynamic 
properties of different pesticides. The fate of 
pesticides depends on aqueous solubility (SOI^), 
measured in mg/L; vapor pressure Oty), measured in 
Pascals; and adsorption, (Koc^ .), measured in L/Kg? and 
half-life (tx*), measured in days. The soil and climate 
characteristics mentioned above in connection with 
groundwater models are also important in determining 
fate of pesticides. However, for the purpose of this
study, these are assumed homogeneous for the region of
study-
As half-life and solubility increase, leaching 
potential increases. As vapor pressure increases, more 
of the pesticide is volatilized and less is apt to reach 
the groundwater. Similarly, if a pesticide is likely to 
be adsorbed to soil particles, it is less likely to 
reach the groundwater. A cumulative leaching index for 
each of these policies based on these principles (LEACH)
is presented in equation 21 (Laskowski, Goring, and 
Swann).
(21) LEACH = X 
i/rc't'
SOL * tX
~“V * Koc(|r ^
* ip$
30
This number for each policy is then divided through by 
the result for the current policy (the ban on aldicarb, 
carbofuran and oxamyl) for easier comparison.
To take into account the acute toxicity of 
pesticide use under each policy, leaching potential is 
divided by the LDS0 for each pesticide. As LDS0 
decreases, toxicity and hazard increase. This is 
represented by HAZARD in equation 2 2 ,
(22) HAZARD = X
The policy with the highest leaching potential is 
the laissez fairs policy. This is not surprising, given 
the large amount of aldicarb used under this policy.
The next highest leaching potential is associated with 
the policy which bans aldicarb, but not carbofuran or 
oxamyl. The policy with the lowest leaching potential 
is the moratorium on potatoes. This is consistent with 
the lower pesticide use on alternative crops. The 
remaining policies all have roughly the same leaching 
potential, with the taxation of chemicals showing the 
highest and rotation showing the lowest. The pest
control district ranks relatively high with the leaching
index*
LEACH
t
LD
it  tp
Or
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The ranking of th. po l l d -  *“  M ' " a “ “
h„  several important “ “ “ “ “  “  ”
th. third meet environmentally « «  >°U  »' 
control districts are the fonrth least — . « ■  “ ““
th. .oratorio, on potatoes, forced —  — ^
. . „  The relative rankings of thethe tax on potatoes.
nolici.es are summarized below in table 6.policies a eHnnablv the most
The laissez faire policy is unquestionab y
harmful to the environment. The evidence of this^is
plain from the contamination levels of aldicar
earbofuran in ths drinking ..ter near potato
Aldicarb levels would exceed the MCL m  the P
The banning of thesefielde in oontinooo. potato...
pastioide. i. • .o»a *“ *«' “ a * ’°°4 “ *
policies.
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Comparison of ^ r o n m e n t a l Indexes
Leach Leach Hazard HazardIndex Index Index IndexTotals; Rank Totals Rank
LaissezFair© 5 9 . 5 3
Ban
1 11*539 1
Temik 1 . 9 9
Ban
2 0.97 3
Furdan &Oxamyl 1 . 0 0
Pest
© 1 . 00 2
Control
District 1 . 4 4 3 0 . 60 6
Ban on
Potatoes 1 . 0 4 A4 0 . 4 1Pesticide y.Tax 1.03 erD 0 - 94 ATax on
Potatoes 0 . 2 3 fty 0 . 4 4 7Purchase iChemicalRights 0 . 3 8 7
0 . 7 6 cCrop D
Rotation 0 . 2 5 o 0 . 4 3 8
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Conclusion
The current policy does not make anybody better off 
without making somebody else worse off. Neither does 
any other policy. Nonetheless, analysis suggests that 
there is room for improvement. Simply requiring farmers 
to reduce potatoes reduces the amount they use of most 
pesticides. This is done at the expense of farm 
income. By itself, crop rotation is not the answer to 
the problem over the long run. It is a palliative 
solution which fails to provide additional incentives to 
grow crops other than potatoes. The policy would be 
relatively easy to administer and would best be left up 
to local government. The need to balance voluntary 
compliance and police power over management decisions 
makes it unlikely that it will gain the public support 
needed to fully implement it. It is also unlikely 
that farmers would volunteer to comply with an 
institution which would reduce their incomes for a few 
years to possibly stabilize income and yield in the
future.
To put the losses by farmers into perspective, the 
value of groundwater needs to be considered. For Long 
island, the aquifer is worth the price of the next 
alternative source of drinking water, estimated to be 
between $5 and $10 billion. Nobody can say for certarn 
how much it would cost to replace the Long Island
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aquifer as a source fQr drinklng ^  Jn ^
the alternatives would require the transportation of 
water fro. upstate Hew and Connecticut. As long as
enough clean water regains on Long Island, measures can
be lass costly, but still can create ^
burdens for water suppliers and local government. For
thS N°rth F°rk alone' treatment for water contaminated
by agricultural chemicals were estimated to cost 
between $7 and $21 million/ while no slngle f ^
capture the risk and the willingness to pay fQr ^  
water, it is apparent that Long island groundwater is a 
precious resource in need of special protection. The 
sacrifices thus far on the part of farmers have not been
excessive in light of these estimates, and, in light of 
future contamination, efforts to reduce the possibility
of pesticide leachate should be undertaken.
. The purchase of crop rights appears to be an 
attractive policy, because it has the highest farm 
income and one of the lowest environmental impacts. 
However, at an estimated annual cost of $26 million per 
year, such a program is likely to be prohibitively 
expensive for a local government already saddled with a 
purchase of development rights program of comparable 
magnitude. Annual cost is estimated to be between $5 
and $7 million at $750 per acre. The level of 
government most likely to be responsible for a rights
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purchase program is the county. Suffolk county 
government is already having severe difficulty with the 
cost of its Purchase of Development Rights program.
Farmers already receive tax breaks where they own land 
in agricultural districts. The county is unlikely to 
have the will to spend a great deal more on transferring 
income from non-farmers to farmers. The policy which 
bans potatoes for two years, for all of its promise in 
reducing pest populations to manageable levels, is so 
costly in its first year that it is unlikely to generate 
much support. The administration could be the same as 
either crop rotation or the pest control district. The 
income loss the first year would be approximately $4 
million compared with the current policy.
The model almost certainly underestimates yields 
and income brought about by those programs which include 
rotation into non-host crops. This is partially 
captured, but because of the lack of data it was 
impossible to estimate how changes in cropping patterns 
change pest dynamics. Whether this bias makes a 
significant difference with respect to these policies' 
performance, it is impossible to say without the data. 
More field data ought to be collected for any pest
control program which is implemented.
The taxation of chemicals would have to take place 
at the state or federal level. Taxation would be almost
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as socially unacceptable as the laissez faire policy in 
this instance.
The taxation of land planted in potatoes would be
the most difficult for farmers, even more than crop 
rotations. An estimated 14% to 20% of farm income would
be taxed away. The amount of tax that would be required 
to make the tax an effective device may not be 
acceptable. Farmers have already had difficulty 
adjusting to the banning of pesticides, if potato land 
were taxed, potato farmers would be free to choose 
the way they want their income reduced. Of all the 
policies, the taxation of land planted in potatoes 
probably underestimated the conversion to 
non-agricultural uses the most.
The hybrids of some of the policies which were 
examined in this study have interesting possibilities.
One hybrid of particular interest is the combination of 
taxation of potatoes with the subsidization of low input 
non-host crops. The high cost to farmers of the tax on 
potato land, as well as the cultivation of some crops 
which are heavy users of pesticides makes it a worst 
case option in many ways, of all the options, taxing 
potatoes would probably result in the greatest loss 
of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses, one 
advantage it has is that it costs the public very 
little. While it does reduce potato acreage, it does
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not eliminate it. On the other hand, the subsidisation 
of low input crops gives farmers a high return and does 
a better job than most policies at the reduction 
of pesticide applications.
By combining a taxation with.a subsidisation 
program, the subsidies would offset the loss of farm 
income, while the taxes would give additional revenue to 
the county government. Farmers would face both positive 
and negative incentives to switch out of potatoes and 
would be willing to sell their rights at a lower 
price. Taxes and subsidies are likely to be asymmetric, 
and the program would either need to be augmented by 
general revenues, if the subsidy rate was high relative 
to the tax rate, or would reduce total farm income if 
the tax rate was high relative to the subsidy rate.
Administration of a combined tax/purchase program 
would likely require careful attention to crop prices, 
input prices and the loss of land to non-agricultural 
uses. A combination of the purchase of crop rights with 
a pest control district would also be likely to increase 
farm income, while reducing the need for pesticide use. 
This would also increase the fiscal and administrative 
burden on local government over and above either 
program. However, many aspects of administration could 
be combined, such as the monitoring of crop rotations 
and coordination of pesticide application programs.
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.........authorls.opinion.is.that.the.most.favorable...
policy for balancing, economic, environmental and 
agricultural would be a program that coordinated pest 
control practices and provided farmers a service for 
ecologically safe, economically sound means of 
controlling potato beetle populations. The adoption of 
such a program faces many obstacles. The first obstacle 
is one of distrust and apathy on the part of farmers. 
Farmers need to be convinced of the long, run benefits of 
coordinating pest control, and that such a program is 
not just another way for big government to try and run 
their lives. The start up costs and initial 
administrative burdens of such a program would lend 
credence to their, skepticism. The development of such a 
district would require the initiative of farmers'who 
were concerned enough to mobilize, if pesticide 
failures become severe, more severe than predicted 
in the model, this could he a force that mobilizes the 
farmers to adopt a pest control district. Lacking that 
incentive, it is unlikely that farmers will adopt a pest 
control district on their own, without outside 
intervention. The existence of outside intervention 
would fuel their suspicion of government action and any 
attempt to impose a district in Suffolk County from 
above would face strong resistance. There would be in 
some cases, the incentive to cheat by augmenting
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publicly provided pesticide applications with one1s own 
sprays. The perceived gains from cheating are likely 
to increase the less a district appears to have the 
interest of farmers in mind. To succeed, the district 
must have the tacit, voluntary support of the majority 
of potato growers on Long Island.
A pest control district would also need to overcome 
the suspicion of environmental groups which might 
perceive a district as a pawn in the hands of farmers, 
able to run roughshod over the environment with chemical 
applications. As we have seen, a pest control district 
does not necessarily have the lowest environmental 
impact or hazard to groundwater associated with it. 
However, pesticide programs can be fine-tuned to reduce 
groundwater impacts, particularly with increased 
information on the transport of pesticides to ground- 
water. A pest control district can also serve as a 
conduit for the latest methods of biological control 
developed by the Land Grant college, facilitate adoption 
of new technology, and move up the learning curve faster 
than individual farmers would.
Pest control districts would require the initiative 
of potato farmers and would have to confront the dilemma 
that is at the heart of this study. The way that pest 
control districts balance their regulatory and service 
functions must be carefully considered. The institu­
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tional mechanisms of a pest control district would have 
to toe flexible enough to confront changing economic and 
environmental conditions* Therefore, the federal 
and even-state levels would be inappropriate for admini­
stering its day to day functions. Because it would 
cover a geographically small, but densely populated and 
intensively farmed area, local government should be able 
to handle the required duties. However, cooperation 
with and technical assistance from state and federal 
government would be important for the success of the 
program.
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